We present CHORUS, a system with a novel architecture for providing differential privacy for statistical SQL queries. The key to our approach is to embed a differential privacy mechanism into the query before execution so the query automatically enforces differential privacy on its output. CHORUS is compatible with any SQL database that supports standard math functions, requires no user modifications to the database or queries, and simultaneously supports many differential privacy mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, no existing system provides these capabilities.
Introduction
Organizations are collecting more and more sensitive information about individuals. As this data is highly valuable for a broad range of business interests, organizations are motivated to provide analysts with flexible access to the data. At the same time, the public is increasingly concerned about privacy protection. There is a growing and urgent need for technology solutions that balance these * Work done while at the University of California, Berkeley interests by supporting general-purpose analytics while guaranteeing privacy protection.
Differential privacy [16, 22] is widely recognized by experts as the most rigorous theoretical solution to this problem. Differential privacy provides a formal guarantee of privacy for individuals while allowing general statistical analysis of the data. In short, it states that the presence or absence of any single individual's data should not have a large effect on the results of a query. This allows precise answers to questions about populations in the data while guaranteeing the results reveal little about any individual. Unlike alternative approaches such as anonymization and k-anonymity, differential privacy protects against a wide range of attacks, including attacks using auxiliary information [53, 42, 44, 15] .
Current research on differential privacy focuses on development of new algorithms, called mechanisms, to achieve differential privacy for a particular class of queries. Researchers have developed dozens of mechanisms covering a broad range of use cases, from generalpurpose statistical queries [19, 43, 38, 39, 46, 40, 10] to special-purpose analytics tasks such as graph analysis [29, 49, 32, 33, 12] , range queries [28, 35, 36, 37, 56, 54, 13, 47, 8, 55] , and analysis of data streams [20, 50] . Each mechanism works well for specific tasks and not as well, or not at all, on other tasks.
Despite extensive academic research and an abundant supply of mechanisms, differential privacy has not been widely adopted in practice. Existing applications of differential privacy in practice are limited to specialized use cases such as web browsing statistics [24] and keyboard and emoji use [2] .
There are two major challenges for practical adoption of differential privacy. The first is seamless integration into real-world data environments. These environments include highly customized data architectures and industrial-grade database engines carefully tuned for performance and reliability. Previous differential privacy systems require changes to the data pipeline [31] or replacement of the database with a custom engine [40, 46, 39] and hence do not integrate easily into these environments.
The second challenge is simultaneously supporting different mechanisms. Current evidence suggests that there is no single "best mechanism" that performs optimally for all queries. Rather, the best mechanism depends on both the query and the dataset. In fact, as demonstrated by Hay et al. [30] , the best mechanism can also vary with the size of the dataset even for a single query. A practical solution must provide flexibility for mechanism selection and easy integration of new mechanisms. Previous differential privacy systems [31, 40, 46] implement only a single mechanism.
The CHORUS system. This paper describes CHORUS, a system with a novel architecture for providing differential privacy for statistical SQL queries. The key insight of our approach is to embed the differential privacy mechanism into the SQL query before execution, so the query automatically enforces differential privacy on its own output. We define a SQL query with this property as an intrinsically private query. CHORUS automatically converts untrusted input queries into intrinsically private queries. This approach enables a new architecture in which queries are rewritten, then submitted to an unmodified database management system (DBMS).
This new architecture addresses the two major challenges outlined above. First, CHORUS is compatible with any SQL database that supports standard math functions (rand, ln, etc.) thus avoiding the need for a custom runtime or modifications to the database engine. By using a standard SQL database engine instead of a custom runtime, CHORUS can leverage the reliability, scalability and performance of modern databases, which are built on decades of research and engineering experience.
Second, CHORUS enables the modular implementation and adoption of many different mechanisms, supporting a significantly higher percentage of queries than any single mechanism and providing increased flexibility for both general and specialized use cases. CHORUS automatically selects a mechanism for each input query based on an extensible set of selection rules.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing system provides these capabilities. CHORUS also protects against an untrusted analyst: even if the submitted query is malicious, our transformation rules ensure that the executed query returns only differentially private results. The results can thus be returned directly to the analyst without post-processing. This enables easy integration into existing data environments via a single pre-processing step.
We demonstrate the CHORUS approach with four existing general-purpose differential privacy mechanisms: Elastic Sensitivity [31] , Restricted Sensitivity [10] , Weighted PINQ [19] and Sample & Aggregate [40] . These mechanisms support a range of SQL features and analytic tasks. CHORUS contains query transformation rules for each mechanism which convert untrusted (non-intrinsically private) queries into intrinsically private queries. We also describe how additional mechanisms can be added to CHORUS. Deployment. CHORUS is currently being deployed at Uber for its internal analytics tasks. CHORUS represents a significant part of the company's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [4] compliance efforts, and provides both differential privacy and access control enforcement. We have made CHORUS available as open source [3] to enable additional deployments elsewhere. Evaluation. In the first evaluation of its kind, we use CHORUS to evaluate the utility and performance of the selected mechanisms on real data. Our dataset includes 18,774 real queries written by analysts at Uber. Contributions. In summary, we make the following contributions:
1. We present CHORUS, representing a novel architecture for enforcing differential privacy on SQL queries that simultaneously supports a wide variety of mechanisms and runs on any standard SQL database ( § 3). 2. We describe and formalize the novel use of rule-based query rewriting to automatically transform an untrusted SQL query into an intrinsically private query using four example general-purpose mechanisms. We describe how other mechanisms can be supported using the same approach ( § 4, 5). 3. We report on our experience deploying CHORUS to enforce differential privacy at Uber, where it processes more than 10,000 queries per day ( § 6). 4. We use CHORUS to conduct the first large-scale empirical evaluation of the utility and performance of multiple general-purpose differential privacy on real queries and data ( § 7).
Background
Differential privacy provides a formal guarantee of indistinguishability. This guarantee is defined in terms of a privacy budget ε-the smaller the budget, the stronger the guarantee. The formal definition of differential privacy is written in terms of the distance d(x, y) between two databases, i.e. the number of entries on which they Table 1 : Differential privacy mechanisms differ: d(x, y) = |{i : x i = y i }|. Two databases x and y are neighbors if d(x, y) = 1. A randomized mechanism K : D n → R preserves (ε, δ )-differential privacy if for any pair of neighboring databases x, y ∈ D n and set S of possible outputs:
Differential privacy can be enforced by adding noise to the non-private results of a query. The scale of this noise depends on the sensitivity of the query. The literature considers two different measures of sensitivity: global [19] and local [43] . For more on differential privacy, see Dwork and Roth [22] .
Statistical queries. Differential privacy aims to protect the privacy of individuals in the context of statistical queries. In SQL terms, these are queries using standard aggregation operators (COUNT, AVG, etc.) as well as histograms created via the GROUP BY operator in which aggregations are applied to records within each group. Differential privacy is not suitable for queries that return raw data (e.g. rows in the database) since such queries are inherently privacy-violating. We formalize the targeted class of queries in Section 5.1. In Section 5.5 we discuss how our approach supports histogram queries, which require special care to avoid leaking information via the presence of absence of groups.
Mechanism design. Research on differential privacy has produced a large and growing number of differential privacy mechanisms. Some mechanisms are designed to provide broad support for many types of queries [19, 43, 38, 39, 46, 40, 10] , while others are designed to produce maximal utility for a particular application [29, 49, 32, 33, 12, 28, 35, 37, 56, 54, 13, 47, 8, 55, 24, 30] .
While mechanisms adopt unique strategies for enforcing differential privacy in their target domain, they generally share a common set of design choices and algorithmic components. For example, many mechanisms require addition of Laplace noise to the result of the query.
Our approach is motivated by the observation that a wide range of distinct mechanisms can supported with a common set of algorithmic building blocks. In this paper we formalize several example building blocks via transformation rules that describe how each algorithmic component can be embedded within a SQL query. We demonstrate the flexibility of this design by showing that each mechanism can be implemented simply by composing these transformation rules according to the mechanism's definition.
General-purpose mechanisms. The four mechanisms in Table 1 are general-purpose because they support a broad range of queries, including commonly used SQL constructs such as join. This paper focuses on these four mechanisms. Many more specialized mechanisms have substantially similar algorithmic requirements and can be supported as intrinsically private queries using variations of the transformation rules introduced in this paper. Section 7.5 discusses this subject in more detail.
The CHORUS Architecture
This section presents the system architecture and advantages of CHORUS, and compares it against existing architectures for differentially private analytics. We first describe the design goals motivating the CHORUS architecture. Then, in Section 3.1, we describe the limitations of existing architectures preventing previous work from attaining these goals. Finally, Section 3.2 describes the novel architecture of CHORUS and provides an overview of our approach.
Design Goals. The design of CHORUS is motivated by the desire to enforce differential privacy for generalpurpose analytics in a practical setting. To that end, CHORUS has the following design goals:
1. Usability for non-experts 2. Support for a wide variety of analytics queries 3. Easy integration with existing data environments As we will demonstrate in the next section, achieving these goals is challenging, and no existing system manages to achieve all three. To achieve the first goal, a system should work with standard query languages (e.g. SQL). To achieve the second goal, a system should be able to leverage the many differential privacy mechanisms listed in Table 1 , and should select a mechanism for a given query automatically. To achieve the third goal, a system should be deployable in the context of an existing database engine.
Existing Architectures
Existing systems for enforcing differential privacy for data analytics tasks adopt one of two architecture types: they are either deeply integrated systems or post processing systems. These architectures are summarized in Figure 1 (a) and Figure 1(b) . PINQ [39] , Weighted PINQ [46] , GUPT [40] , and Airavat [48] follow the deep integration architecture: each one provides its own specialized DBMS, and cannot be used with a standard DBMS.
Elastic sensitivity [31] uses the post processing architecture, in which the original query is run on the database and noise is added to the final result. This approach supports mechanisms that do not modify the semantics of the original query (PINQ and Restricted sensitivity [10] could also be implemented this way), and has the advantage that it is compatibile with existing DBMSs. However, the post processing architecture is fundamentally incompatible with mechanisms that change how the original query executes-including WPINQ and Sample & Aggregate, listed in Table 1 .
The deeply integrated and post processing architectures in Figure 1 (a) and (b) therefore both fail to address two major challenges in implementing a practical system for differentially private data analytics:
• Custom DBMSs are unlikely to achieve parity with mature DBMSs for a wide range of features including rich SQL support, broad query optimization, highperformance transaction support, recoverability, scalability and distribution.
• Neither architecture supports the simultaneous application of a large number of different mechanisms. The deeply integrated architecture requires building a new DBMS for each mechanism, while the post processing architecture is inherently incompatible with some mechanisms.
The CHORUS Architecture
In CHORUS, we propose a novel alternative to the deeply integrated and post processing architectures used by existing systems. As shown in Figure 1 (c), CHORUS transforms the input query into an intrinsically private query, which is a standard SQL query whose results are guaranteed to be differentially private. An intrinsically private query provides this guarantee by embedding a differential privacy mechanism in the query itself. When executed on an unmodified SQL database, the embedded privacy mechanism ensures that the query's results preserve differential privacy. The approach has three key advantages over previous work:
• CHORUS is DBMS-independent (unlike the deeply integrated approach): it requires neither modifying the database nor switching to purpose-built database engines. Our approach can therefore leverage existing high-performance DBMSs to scale to big data.
• CHORUS can implement a wide variety of privacypreserving techniques. Unlike the post processing approach, CHORUS is compatible with all of the mechanisms listed in Table 1 , and many more.
• CHORUS eliminates the need for post-processing, allowing easy integration in existing data processing pipelines. Our approach enables a single data processing pipeline for all mechanisms.
By adopting this novel architecture, CHORUS achieves all three design goals listed earlier. Since input queries are considered untrusted and the rewriting engine uses program analysis techniques, CHORUS preserves differential privacy even in the face of malicious analysts. CHORUS's architecture is specifically designed to be easily integrated into existing data environments. We report on the deployment of CHORUS at Uber in Section 6.
Constructing intrinsically private queries. The primary challenge in implementing this architecture is transforming untrusted queries into intrinsically private queries. This process must be flexible enough to support a wide variety of privacy mechanisms and also general enough to support ad-hoc SQL queries.
As described earlier, constructing intrinsically private queries automatically has additional advantages. This approach protects against malicious analysts by guaranteeing differentially private results by construction. It is also transparent to the analyst since it does not require input from the analyst to preserve privacy or select a privacy mechanism.
As shown in Figure 1 (c), CHORUS constructs intrinsically private queries in two steps:
1. The Mechanism Selection component automatically selects an appropriate differential privacy mechanism to apply. 2. The Query Rewriting component embeds the selected mechanism in the input query, transforming it into an intrinsically private query.
To select a mechanism, CHORUS leverages an extensible mechanism selection engine, discussed next. The Pros:
CHORUS
• Broad mechanism support Cons:
• Higher software complexity • New system required for each mechanism
Pros:
• DBMS-independent Cons:
• Supports only post-processing mechanisms
• DBMS-independent • Broad mechanism support query rewriting step then transforms the input query to produce an intrinsically private query embedding the selected mechanism. For this step, we employ a novel use of rule-based query rewriting, which has been studied extensively for query optimization but, to our knowledge, never applied to differential privacy. We introduce our solution by example in Section 4and formalize it in Section 5. This paper focuses on differential privacy, but the same approach could be used to enforce other types of privacy guarantees or security policies [52] .
Mechanism selection. CHORUS implements an extensible mechanism selection engine that automatically selects a differential privacy mechanism for each input query. This engine can be extended based on available mechanisms, performance and utility goals, and to support custom mechanism selection techniques. For example, Hay et al. [34] demonstrate that a machine learningbased approach can leverage properties of the data to select a mechanism most likely to yield high utility. CHO-RUS is designed to support any such approach. We describe an example of a syntax-based mechanism selection in Section 6.
Privacy budget management. CHORUS does not prescribe a specific privacy budget management strategy, as the best way to manage the available privacy budget in practice will depend on the deployment scenario and threat model. CHORUS provides flexibility in how the budget is managed: the sole requirement is that rewriters are supplied with the ε value apportioned to each query. 1 
Query Rewriting
This section demonstrates our approach by example, using the four general-purpose differential privacy mechanisms listed in Table 1 . For each mechanism, we briefly review the algorithm used. Then, we describe, using simple example queries, how an input SQL query can be systematically transformed into an intrinsically private query embedding that algorithm, and give an argument for the correctness of each transformation.
Sensitivity-Based Mechanisms
We first consider two mechanisms that add noise to the final result of the query: Elastic Sensitivity [31] and Restricted Sensitivity [10] . Elastic Sensitivity is a bound on the local sensitivity of a query, while Restricted Sensitivity is based on global sensitivity. Both approaches add Laplace noise to the query's result. For a query with sensitivity s returning value v, the Laplace mechanism releases v + Lap(s/ε), where ε is the privacy budget allocated to the query. Given a ran-ε values in a separate table and referencing and updating the values within the rewritten query. dom variable U sampled from the uniform distribution, we can compute the value of a random variable X ∼ Lap(s/ε):
In SQL, we can sample from the uniform distribution using RANDOM(). Consider the following query, which returns a (non-differentially private) count of trips in the database. This query can be transformed into an intrinsically private query as follows:
The first step defines U using RANDOM(), and the second uses U to compute the corresponding Laplace noise.
The correctness of this approach follows from the definition of the Laplace mechanism. The two transformation steps combined clearly generate Laplace noise with the correct scale, and add it to the sensitive query results.
CHORUS can calculate either Elastic Sensitivity with smoothing via smooth sensitivity [43] 2 or Restricted Sensitivity via a dataflow analysis of the query. Such an analysis is described in [31] .
We formalize the construction of intrinsically private queries via sensitivity-based approaches using the Laplace Noise transformation, defined in Section 5.
Weighted PINQ
Weighted PINQ (WPINQ) enforces differential privacy for counting queries with equijoins. A key distinction of this mechanism is that it produces a differentially private metric (called a weight), rather than a count. These weights are suitable for use in a workflow that generates differentially private synthetic data, from which counts are easily derived. The workflow described in [46] uses weights as input to a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) process.
CHORUS's implementation of WPINQ computes noisy weights for a given counting query according to the mechanism's definition [46] . Since the weights are differentially private, they can be released to the analyst for use with any desired workflow.
The WPINQ mechanism adds a weight to each row of the database, updates the weights as the query executes to ensure that the query has a sensitivity of 1, and uses the Laplace mechanism to add noise to the weighted query result. WPINQ has been implemented as a standalone data processing engine with a specialized query language, but has not been integrated into any SQL DBMS.
Where a standard database is a collection of tuples in D n , a weighted database (as defined in Proserpio et al. [46] ) is a function from a tuple to its weight (D → R). In this setting, counting the number of tuples with a particular property is analogous to summing the weights of all such tuples. Counting queries can therefore be performed using sum.
In fact, summing weights in a weighted dataset produces exactly the same result as the corresponding counting query on the original dataset, when the query does not contain joins. When the query does contain joins, WPINQ scales the weight of each row of the join's output to maintain a sensitivity of 1. Proserpio et al. [46] define the weight of each row in a join as follows:
Since the scaled weights ensure a sensitivity of 1, Laplace noise scaled to 1/ε is sufficient to enforce differential privacy. WPINQ adds noise with this scale to the results of the weighted query.
In SQL, we can accomplish the first task (adding weights) by adding a column to each relation. Consider transforming our previous example query:
This transformation adds a weight of 1 to each row in the table, and changes the COUNT aggregation function into a SUM of the rows' weights. The correctness of this transformation is easy to see: as required by WPINQ [46] , the transformed query adds a weight to each row, and uses SUM in place of COUNT. We can accomplish the second task (scaling weights for joins) by first calculating the norms ||A K || and ||B k || for each key k, then the new weights for each row using A k × B T k . For a join between the trips and drivers tables, for example, we can compute the norms for each key: The correctness of this transformation follows from equation (1) . The relation tnorms corresponds to ||A k ||, and dnorms to ||B k ||. For each key, t.weight corresponds to A k , and d.weight to B k .
Finally, we can accomplish the third task (adding Laplace noise scaled to 1/ε) as described earlier.
We formalize the construction of intrinsically private queries via WPINQ using three transformations: the Metadata Propagation transformation to add weights to each row, the Replace Aggregation Function transformation to replace counts with sums of weights, and the Laplace Noise transformation to add noise to the results. All three are defined in Section 5.
Sample & Aggregate
The Sample & Aggregate [43, 51] mechanism works for all statistical estimators, but does not support joins. Sample & Aggregate has been implemented in GUPT [40] , a standalone data processing engine that operates on Python programs, but has never been integrated into a practical database. As defined by Smith [51] , the mechanism has three steps:
1. Split the database into disjoint subsamples 2. Run the query on each subsample independently 3. Aggregate the results using a differentially-private algorithm For differentially-private aggregation, Smith [51] suggests Widened Winsorized mean. Intuitively, Widened Winsorized mean first calculates the interquartile range-the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile of the subsampled results. Next, the algorithm widens this range to include slightly more data points, then clamps the subsampled results to lie within the widened range. This step eliminates outliers, which is important for enforcing differential privacy. Finally, the algorithm takes the average of the clamped results, and adds Laplace noise scaled to the size of the range (i.e. the effective sensitivity) divided by ε.
In SQL, we can accomplish tasks 1 and 2 by adding a GROUP BY clause to the original query. Consider a query that computes the average of trip lengths: SELECT AVG ( t r i p d i s t a n c e ) FROM trips
⇓ SELECT AVG ( t r i p d i s t a n c e ) , R O W N U M () MOD n AS samp FROM trips GROUP BY samp
This transformation generates n subsamples and runs the original query on each one. The correctness of tasks 1 and 2 follows from the definition of subsampling: the GROUP BY ensures that the subsamples are disjoint, and that the query runs on each subsample independently. To accomplish task 3 (differentially private aggregation), we can use a straightforward implementation of Widened Winsorized mean in SQL, since the algorithm itself is the same for each original query.
We formalize the construction of intrinsically private queries via Sample & Aggregate using the Subsampling transformation, defined in Section 5.
Formalization & Correctness
This section formalizes the construction of intrinsically private queries as introduced in Section 4. We begin by introducing notation (Section 5.1). We then define reusable transformation rules (Section 5.2) that can be composed to construct mechanisms. Next, we formalize the four mechanisms described earlier in terms of these rules (Section 5.3). Finally, we prove a correctness property: our transformations do not modify the semantics of the input query (Section 5.4).
By formalizing the transformation rules separately from the individual mechanisms, we allow the rules to be re-used in defining new mechanisms-taking advantage of the common algorithmic requirements demonstrated in Table 1 . An additional benefit of this approach is the ability to prove correctness properties of the rules themselves, so that these properties extend to all mechanisms implemented using the rules.
Preliminaries
Core relational algebra. We formalize our transformations as rewriting rules on a core relational algebra that represents general statistical queries. We define the core relational algebra in Figure 2 . This algebra includes the most commonly-used features of query languages like SQL: selection (σ ), projection (Π), equijoins ( ), and counting with and without aggregation. We also include several features specifically necessary for our implementations: constant values, random numbers, and the arithmetic functions ln, abs, and sign.
We use standard notation for relational algebra with a few exceptions. We extend the projection operator Π to attribute expressions, which allows projection to add new named columns to a relation. For example, if relation r has schema U, then the expression Π U∪weight:1 r adds a new column named "weight" with the default value 1 for each row to the existing columns in r. In addition, we combine aggregation and grouping, writing Count a 1 ..a n to indicate a counting aggregation with grouping by columns a 1 ..a n . We write Sum a a 1 ..a n to indicate summation of column a, grouping by columns a 1 ..a n .
Notation for rewriting rules. Each transformation is defined as a set of inference rules that rewrites a relational algebra expression. A particular rule allows rewriting an expression as specified in its conclusion (below the line) if the conditions specified in its antecedent (above the line) are satisfied (either through syntactic properties of the query or by applying another inference rule).
Our approach relies on the ability to analyze and rewrite SQL queries. This rewriting can be achieved by a rule-based query optimization engine [1, 5] .
Most of the conditions specified in our rewriting rules use standard notation. One exception is conditions of the form Q : U, which we use to denote that the query Q results in a relation with schema U. We extend this notation to denote the schemas of database tables (e.g. t : U) and relational expressions (e.g. r 1 : U).
Some of our rewriting rules have global parameters, which we denote by setting them above the arrow indicating the rewriting rule itself. For example, r x → Π x r allows rewriting r to project only the column named x, where the value of x is provided as a parameter. Most parameters are values, but parameters can also be functions mapping a relational algebra expression to a new expression. For example, r f → f (r) indicates rewriting r to the result of f (r).
Transformation Rules
Laplace Noise. All four mechanisms in Table 1 require generating noise according to the Laplace distribution. We accomplish this task using the Laplace Noise transformation, defined in Figure 3 . This transformation has one parameter: γ, which defines the scale of the noise to be added to the query's result. For a query with sensitivity 1 and privacy budget ε, for example, γ = 1/ε suffices to enforce differential privacy.
The Laplace Noise transformation defines a single inference rule. This rule allows rewriting a top-level query with schema U according to the Lap function. Lap wraps the query in two projection operations; the first (defined in Unif) samples the uniform distribution for each value in the result, and the second (defined in Lap) uses this value to add noise drawn from the Laplace distribution.
Attribute expressions
Selection predicates ϕ ::= e 1 θ e 2 | eθ v
Figure 2: Syntax of core relational algebra To accomplish this, we define the Metadata Propagation transformation in Figure 4 . The Metadata Propagation transformation adds a column to each referenced table and initializes its value for each row in that table, then uses the specified composition functions to compose the values of the metadata column for each resulting row of a join or an aggregation. The Metadata Propagation transformation has three parameters: i, a function defining the initial value of the metadata attribute for each row in a database table; j, a function specifying how to update the metadata column for a join of two relations; and c, a function specifying how to update the metadata column for subqueries.
The inference rule for a table t uses projection to add a new attribute to t's schema to hold the metadata, and initializes that attribute to the value of i(). The rules for projection and selection simply propagate the new attribute. The rule for joins applies the j function to perform a localized update of the metadata column. The rules for counting subqueries invoke the update function c to determine the new value for the metadata attribute. Finally, the rules for counting queries eliminate the metadata attribute to preserve the top-level schema of the query. Replacing Aggregation Functions. The Replace Aggregation Function transformation, defined in Figure 5 , allows replacing one aggregation function (Γ) with another (Γ ). To produce syntactically valid output, Γ and Γ must be drawn from the set of available aggregation Subsampling. The Subsampling transformation, defined in Figure 6 , splits the database into disjoint subsamples, runs the original query on each subsample, and aggregates the results according to a provided function. The Subsampling transformation is defined in terms of the Metadata Propagation transformation, and can be used to implement partition-based differential privacy mechanisms like Sample & Aggregate.
The parameters for the Subsampling transformation are A , a function that aggregates the subsampled results, and n, the number of disjoint subsamples to use during subsampling. Both inference rules defined by the transformation rewrite the queried relation using the Metadata Propagation transformation (r i, j,c → r ). The parameters for Metadata Propagation initialize the metadata attribute with a random subsample number between zero and n, and propagate the subsample number over counting subqueries. The update functions for joins and counting subqueries is undefined, because subsampling is incompatible with queries containing these features. 3 In order to satisfy the semantics preservation property, the aggregation function A must transform the query results on each subsample into a final result with the same shape as the original query. Many aggregation functions satisfy this property (e.g. the mean of all subsamples), but not all of them provide differential privacy.
Mechanism Definitions
We now formally define the mechanisms described earlier in terms of the transformations defined in Section 5.2. We describe each mechanism as a series of one or more transformations, and define the parameters for each transformation to obtain the correct semantics for the mechanism. 
Correctness
The correctness criterion for a traditional query rewriting system is straightforward: the rewritten query should have the same semantics (i.e. return the same results) as the original query. For intrinsically private queries, however, the definition of correctness is less clear: enforcing differential privacy requires modifying the results to preserve privacy.
In this section, we define semantic preservation, which formalizes the intuitive notion that our transformations should perturb the result attributes of the query, as required for enforcing differential privacy, but change nothing else about its semantics. Semantic preservation holds when the transformation in question preserves the size and shape of the query's output, and additionally preserves its logical attributes. Logical attributes are those which are used as join keys or to perform filtering (i.e. the query makes decisions based on these attributes, instead of simply outputting them).
Each of our transformations preserve this property. Furthermore, semantic preservation is preserved over composition of transformations, so semantic preservation holds for any mechanism defined using our transformations-including those defined in Section 5.3.
Definition 1 (Logical Attribute
). An attribute a is a logical attribute if it appears as a join key in a join expression, in the filter condition ϕ of a filter expression, or in the set of grouping attributes of a Count or Sum expression.
Definition 2 (Semantic Preservation).
A transformation (→) satisfies semantic preservation if for all queries Q and Q , if Q → Q , then (1) the schema is preserved: Q : U ⇒ Q : U; (2) the number of output rows is preserved: |Q| = |Q |; and (3) logical attributes are preserved (see Definition 3).
Definition 3 (Logical Attribute Preservation).
Consider a transformation Q : U → Q : U. Split U into two sets of attributes {U k ,U a }, such that U k contains all of the attributes from U used as logical attributes in Q and U a contains all of the other attributes. Now construct Q r by renaming each attribute k ∈ U k in Q to k . Then → preserves logical attributes if there exists a one-to-one relation E ⊆ Q × Q r such that for all e ∈ E and k ∈ U k , e k = e k .
Theorem 1 (Composition).
If two transformations (→ a and → b ) both satisfy semantic preservation, then their composition (→ c ) satisfies semantic preservation: for all queries Q, Q , and Q , if Q → a Q → b Q implies that Q → c Q , and both → a and → b preserve semantics, then → c preserves semantics.
Proof. Assume that → a and → b preserve semantics, and Q → a Q → b Q . We have that: (1) Q : U, Q : U, and Q : U ; (2) |Q| = |Q | = |Q |; and (3) Q, Q , and Q contain the same logical attributes. Thus by Definition 2, → c preserves semantics. (Figure 3) satisfies the semantic preservation property.
Theorem 2. The Laplace Noise transformation
Proof. The rules in Figure 3 define only one transformation, at the top level of the query. The Unif function adds a column u x for each original column x; the Lap function consumes this column, replacing the original column x with its original value plus a value sampled from the Laplace distribution. The outermost projection produces exactly the same set of attributes as the input query Q, preserving the schema; the transformation adds only projection nodes, so the number of output rows is preserved; no join or select can occur at the top level of a query, so no logical attributes are modified. Proof. The only rules that make major modifications to the original query are those for joins and counts. The other rules add a new attribute m and propagate it through the query, but do not change the number or contents of the rows of any relation. At the top level of the query (i.e. q ∈ Q), the transformation eliminates the attribute m. For queries without joins or subquery aggregations, the Metadata Propagation transformation is the identity transformation, so it satisfies semantic preservation.
We argue the remaining cases by induction on the structure of Q. Proof. Aggregation function replacement has the potential to modify the values of the query's results, but not its shape or logical attributes. The transformation's only rule allows changing one function to another, but preserves the grouping columns and number of functions. The schema, number of rows, and logical attributes are therefore preserved.
Theorem 5 (Subsampling preserves semantics). If the aggregation function A aggregates over the m attribute, then our Subsampling transformation (Figure 6 ) satisfies the semantic preservation property.
Proof. We know that Q has the form Count(r) or Count → r , then r has the same semantics as r . We proceed by cases. Case Q = Count(r). Let q 1 = Count m (r ). By the definition of the transformation, Q = A (q 1 ). The query q 1 has exactly one row per unique value of m. Since A aggregates over m, A (q 1 ) has exactly one row, and therefore preserves the semantics of Q.
(r ). By the definition of the transformation, Q = A (q 1 ). The query q 1 has exactly one row per unique tuple (G 1 ..G n , m). Since A aggregates over m, A (q 1 ) has exactly one row per unique tuple (G 1 ..G n ), and therefore preserves the semantics of Q.
Handling Histogram Queries
SQL queries can use the GROUP BY operator to return a relation representing a histogram, as in the following query which counts the number of trips greater than 100 miles in each city:
SELECT city id , COUNT ( * ) as count FROM trips WHERE distance > 100 GROUP BY c i t y i d
This type of query presents a problem for differential privacy because the presence or absence of a particular city in the results reveals whether the count for that city was zero.
The general solution to this problem is to require the analyst to explicitly provide a set of desired bins, and return a (noisy) count of zero for absent bins. Such an approach is used, for example, in PINQ [39] , Weighted PINQ [46] , and FLEX [31] . Unfortunately, this approach impose an unfamiliar user experience and is burdensome for the analyst, who is never allowed to view the results directly.
For bins with finite domain, CHORUS provides a superior solution by enumerating missing histogram bins automatically in the rewritten query. The missing bins are populated with empty aggregation values (e.g., 0 for counts) before mechanism-specific rewriting, at which point they are handled identically as non-empty bins. This allows the full results of histogram queries to be returned to the analyst without post-processing or interposition. If the domain cannot be enumerated (e.g., because it is unbounded), CHORUS falls back to the approach described above and does not release results directly to the analyst.
This feature requires the operator to define a mapping from columns that may be used in a GROUP BY clause to the database field containing the full set of values from that column's domain. This information may be defined manually or extracted from the database schema (e.g., via primary and foreign key constraints), and is provided during initial deployment.
In this example, suppose the full set of city ids are stored in column city id of The RIGHT JOIN ensures that exactly one row exists in the output relation for each city id in cities, and the CASE expression outputs a zero for each missing city in the original query's results. The query thus contains every city id value regardless of the semantics of the original query. This intermediate query is then sent to the mechanism rewriter, which adds noise to each bin as normal.
Implementation & Deployment
This section describes our implementation of CHORUS and our experience deploying it to enforce differential privacy at Uber.
Implementation
Our implementation of CHORUS automatically transforms an input SQL query into an intrinsically private query. CHORUS currently supports the four differential privacy mechanisms discussed here, and is designed for easy extension to new mechanisms. We have released CHORUS as an open source project [3] . Our implementation is built on Apache Calcite [1] , a generic query optimization framework that transforms input queries into a relational algebra tree and provides facilities for transforming the tree and emitting a new SQL query. We built a custom dataflow analysis and rewriting framework on Calcite to support intrinsically private queries. The framework, mechanism-specific analyses, and rewriting rules are implemented in 5,096 lines of Java and Scala code.
The approach could also be implemented with other query optimization frameworks or rule-based query rewriters such as Starburst [45] , ORCA [5] , and Cascades [26] .
Privacy Budget Management
We have designed CHORUS to be flexible in its handling of the privacy budget, since best approach in a given setting is likely to depend on the domain and the kinds of queries posed. A complete study of approaches for managing the privacy budget is beyond the scope of this work, but we outline some possible strategies here. We describe the specific method used in our deployment in the next subsection.
As described earlier, a simple approach to budget management involves standard composition. More sophisticated methods for privacy budget accounting include the advanced composition [23] and parallel composition [19] , both of which are directly applicable in our setting. For some mechanisms, the moments account [7] could be used to further reduce privacy cost.
Support for other mechanisms. Mechanisms themselves can also have a positive effect on the privacy budget, and many mechanisms have been designed to provide improved accuracy for a workload of similar queries. Many of these mechanisms are implemented in terms of lower-level mechanisms (such as the Laplace mechanism) that CHORUS already supports, and therefore could be easily integrated in CHORUS.
The sparse vector technique [21] answers a sequence of queries, but only gives answers for queries in whose results lie above a given threshold. The technique is implemented in terms of the Laplace mechanism.
The Matrix Mechanism [36] and MWEM [28] algorithms both answer a query workload by posing carefully chosen queries on the private database using a lowerlevel mechanism (e.g. the Laplace mechanism), then using the results to build a representation that can answer the queries in the workload.
The Exponential Mechanism [38] enforces differential privacy for queries that return categorical (rather than numeric) data, by picking from the possible outputs with probability generated from an analyst-provided scoring function. This technique can be be implemented as an intrinsically private query if the scoring function is given in SQL; the transformed query can run the function on each possible output and then pick from the possibilities according to the generated distribution.
Deployment
CHORUS is currently being deployed to enforce differential privacy for analysts that query customer data at Uber. The primary goals of this deployment are to protect the privacy of customers from insider attacks, and to ensure compliance with the requirements of Europe's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [4] . In the current deployment, CHORUS processes more than 10,000 queries per day.
Data environment & architecture. The data environment into which CHORUS is deployed consists of several DBMSs (three primary databases, plus several more for specific applications), and a single central query interface through which all queries are submitted. The query interface is implemented as a microservice that performs query processing and then submits the query to the appropriate DBMS and returns the results.
Our deployment involves a minimal wrapper around the CHORUS library to expose its rewriting functionality as a microservice. The only required change to the data environment was a single modification to the query interface, to submit queries to the CHORUS microservice for rewriting before execution. The wrapper around CHORUS also queries a policy microservice to determine the security and privacy policy for the user submitting the query. This policy informs which rewriter is usedby default, differential privacy is required, but for some privileged users performing specific business tasks, differential privacy is only used for older data.
A major challenge of this deployment has been supporting the variety of SQL dialects used by the various DBMSs. The Calcite framework is intended to provide support for multiple dialects, but this support is incomplete and we have had to make changes to Calcite in order to support custom SQL dialects such as Vertica.
Privacy budget. The privacy budget is managed by the microservice wrapper around CHORUS. The microservice maintains a small amount of state to keep track of the current cumulative privacy cost of all queries submitted so far, and updates this state when a new query is submitted.
The current design of the CHORUS microservice maintains a single global budget, and uses advanced composition [22] to track the total budget used for the queries submitted so far.
As we gain experience with the deployment, we are beginning to consider more sophisticated budget management approaches that take advantages of properties of the data and the query workload. For example, new data is added to the database continuously in this particular use case, so recent work leveraging the growth of the database to answer an unbounded number of queries [14] may be directly applicable.
Mechanism selection. Our deployment of CHORUS leverages a syntax-based selection procedure which aims to optimize for utility (low error). As we show in Section 7.4, this approach performs well for this deployment. For different query workloads, other approaches may work significantly better, and CHORUS is designed to support extension to these cases.
The syntax-based approach uses a set of rules that map SQL constructs supported by each mechanism to a heuristic scoring function indicating how likely queries using that construct will yield high utility. For example, Restricted sensitivity [10] supports counting queries with joins, but does not support many-to-many joins. Elastic sensitivity [31] supports a wider set of equijoins, including many-to-many joins, but generally provides slightly lower utility than Restricted sensitivity due to smoothing. Sample & aggregate [51] does not support joins, but does support additional aggregation functions (including "average" and "median").
When a query is submitted, the mechanism selection engine analyzes the query to determine its syntactic properties including how many joins it has, of what type, and what aggregation functions it uses. It then applies the rules to determine which mechanisms can support the query and selects the mechanism with highest score. Note this process does not depend on the data and hence does not consume privacy budget.
This approach represents a simple but effective strategy for automatic mechanism selection. In Section 7.4, we demonstrate that our rules are effective for selecting the best mechanism on a real-world query workload. This approach is also easily extended when a new mechanism is added: the mechanism designer simply adds new rules for SQL constructs supported by the mechanism. Moreover, the scoring function can be tuned for other objectives, for example favoring mechanisms achieving low performance overhead rather than highest utility.
Evaluation
This section reports results of the following experiments:
• We report the percentage of queries that can be supported by each mechanism as intrinsically privacy queries using a corpus of real-world queries, demonstrating that a combination of the four evaluated mechanisms covers 93.9% of these queries.
• We use CHORUS to conduct the first empirical study of several differential privacy mechanisms on a realworld SQL workload. We report the performance overhead and utility of each mechanism across its supported class of queries.
• We demonstrate that our rule-based approach for automatic mechanism selection is effective at selecting the best mechanism for each input query. Using the simple set of rules presented earlier, our approach selects the optimal mechanism for nearly 90% of the queries in our corpus.
Corpus. We use a corpus of 18,774 real-world queries containing all statistical queries executed by data analysts at Uber during October 2016. The corpus includes queries written for several use cases including fraud detection, marketing, business intelligence and general data exploration. It is therefore highly diverse and representative of SQL data analytics queries generally. The queries were executed on a database of data sampled from the production database.
Mechanism Support for Queries
Each mechanism evaluated supports a different subset of queries. This is due to the unique limitations and supported constructs of each mechanism, as summarized in Section 3. We measured the percentage of queries from our corpus supported by each mechanism to assess that mechanism's coverage on a real-world workload. Figure 7 depicts the relative size and overlap of each set of supported queries for the evaluated mechanisms. Elastic Sensitivity is the most general mechanism and can support 71.4% of the queries in our corpus, followed by Restricted Sensitivity (57.6%), WPINQ (30.3%) and Sample & Aggregate (45.4%). Elastic Sensitivity and Restricted Sensitivity support largely the same class of queries, and WPINQ supports a subset of the queries supported by these two mechanisms. In Section 7.5 we discuss limitations preventing the use of WPINQ for certain classes of queries supported by Elastic Sensitivity and Restricted Sensitivity.
Sample & Aggregate supports some queries supported by other mechanisms (counting queries that do not use join), as well as a class of queries using statistical estimators (such as sum and average), that are not supported by the other mechanisms. In total, 93.9% of queries are supported by at least one of the four mechanisms.
The results highlight a key advantage of our approach: different classes of queries can be simultaneously supported via selection of one or more specialized mechanisms. This ensures robust support across a wide range of general and specialized use cases, and allows incremental adoption of future state-of-the-art mechanisms.
Performance Overhead
We conduct a performance evaluation demonstrating the performance overhead of each mechanism when implemented as an intrinsically private query. Experiment Setup. We used a single HP Vertica 7.2.3 [6] node containing 300 million records including trips, rider and driver information and other associated data stored across 8 tables. We submitted the queries locally and ran queries sequentially to avoid any effects from network latency and concurrent workloads.
To establish a baseline we ran each original query 10 times and recorded the average after dropping the lowest and highest times to control for outliers. For every mechanism, we used CHORUS to transform each of the mechanism's supported queries into an intrinsically private query. We executed each intrinsically private query 10 times and recorded the average execution time, again dropping the fastest and slowest times. We calculate the overhead for each query by comparing the average runtime of the intrinsically private query against its baseline. 4 Results. The results are presented in Table 2 . The average overhead and median overhead for Elastic Sensitivity are 2.82% and 1.7%, for Restricted Sensitivity these are 3.2% and 1.6%, for WPINQ 50.9% and 21.58% and for Sample & Aggregate 587% and 394%. Figure 9 shows the distribution of overhead as a function of original query execution time. This distribution shows that the percentage overhead is highest when the original query was very fast (less than 100ms). This is because even a small incremental performance cost is fractionally larger for these queries. The values reported in Table 2 are therefore a conservative estimate of the overhead apparent to the analyst.
WPINQ and Sample & Aggregate significantly alter the way the query executes (see Section 4) and these changes increase query execution time. In the case of WPINQ, the query transformation adds a new join to the query each time weights are rescaled (i.e. one new join for each join in the original query), and these new joins result in the additional overhead. Sample & Aggregate requires additional grouping and aggregation steps. We hypothesize that these transformations are difficult for the database to optimize during execution. Figure 9 shows that, in both cases, the performance impact is amortized over higher query execution times, resulting in a lower relative overhead for more expensive queries.
Utility of Selected Mechanisms
CHORUS enables the first empirical study of the utility of many differential privacy mechanisms on a real-world query workload. This experiment reveals innate trends of each mechanism on a common database and query workload. For each differential privacy mechanism, this experiment reports the relative magnitude of error added to results of its supported query set. We present the results as a function of query sample size, discussed below.
Experiment Setup. We use the same setup described in the previous section to evaluate the utility of Elastic Sensitivity, Restricted Sensitivity, and Sample & Aggregate. As described in Section 4.2, WPINQ's output is a differentially private statistic used as input to a post-processing step, rather than an answer to the query posed, so we do not measure WPINQ's utility.
For each query, we set the privacy budget ε = 0.1 for all mechanisms. For Elastic Sensitivity, we set δ = n −ε ln n (where n is the database size), following Dwork and Lei [18] . For Sample & Aggregate, we set the number of subsamples = n 0.4 , following Mohan et al. [40] .
We ran each intrinsically private query 10 times on the database and report the median relative error across these executions. For each run we report the relative error as the percentage difference between the differentially private result and the original non-private result. Consistent with previous evaluations of differential privacy [30] we report error as a proxy for utility since data analysts are primarily concerned with accuracy of results.
If a query returns multiple rows (e.g., histogram queries) we calculate the mean error across all histogram bins. If the query returns multiple columns we treat each output column independently since noise is applied separately to every column. Query Sample Size. Our corpus includes queries covering a broad spectrum of use cases, from highly selective analytics (e.g., trips in San Francisco completed in the past hour) to statistics of large populations (e.g., all trips in the US). Differential privacy generally requires the addition of more noise to highly selective queries than to queries over large populations, since the influence of any individual's data diminishes as population size increases. Consequently, a query's selectivity is important for interpreting the relative error introduced by differential privacy. To measure the selectivity we calculate the sample size of every aggregation function in the original query, which represents the number of input records to which the function was applied. Results. Figures 9 and 10 show the results of this experiment. All three mechanisms exhibit the expected inverse relationship between sample size and error; moreover, this trend is apparent for queries with and without joins.
Where the other three mechanisms support only counting queries, Sample & Aggregate supports all statistical estimators. Figure 10 shows the utility results for Sample & Aggregate, highlighting the aggregation function used. These results indicate that Sample & Aggregate can provide high utility (<10% error) for each of its supported aggregation functions on approximately half of the queries.
Automatic Mechanism Selection
We evaluated the effectiveness of the syntax-based automatic mechanism selection approach described in Section 6.For each query in our corpus, this experiment compares the utility achieved by the mechanism selected by our rule-based approach to the best possible utility achievable by any mechanism implemented in CHORUS. Experiment Setup. We used the same corpus of queries and the same database of trips as in the other experiments. For each query, we ran all of the mechanisms that support the query and recorded the relative error (i.e. utility) of each one. We defined the oracle utility for each query to be the minimum error achieved by any of the four implemented mechanisms for that query. The oracle utility is intended to represent the utility that could be obtained if a perfect oracle for mechanism selection were available. We used our syntax-based mechanism selection method to select a single mechanism, and determined the utility of that mechanism. Finally, we computed the difference between the oracle utility and the utility achieved by our selected mechanism. Results. We present the results in Figure 11 . For 88% Figure 9 : Utility of elastic sensitivity and restricted sensitivity, by presence of joins. Figure 11 : Effectiveness of automatic mechanism selection.
of the queries in our corpus, the automatic mechanism selection rules select the best mechanism, and therefore provide the same utility as the oracle utility. Of the remaining queries, the selected mechanism often provides nearly oracle utility: for 7% of queries, the selected mechanism is within 10% error of the oracle utility. The remaining queries (5%) represent opportunities for improving the approach-perhaps through the use of a prediction model trained on features of the query and data. Previous work [30, 34] uses such a machine learning-based approach; for range queries, these results suggest that a learning-based approach can be very effective, though the approach has not been evaluated on other types of queries.
Discussion and Key Takeaways
Strengths & weaknesses of differential privacy. The mechanisms we studied generally worked best for statistical queries over large populations. None of the mechanisms was able to provide accurate results (e.g. within 1% error) for a significant number of queries over populations smaller than 1,000. These results confirm the existing wisdom that differential privacy is ill-suited for queries with small sample sizes. For large populations (e.g. more than 10,000), on the other hand, multiple mechanisms were able to provide accurate results. In addition, a large set of such queries exists in our corpus.
Mechanism performance. Our performance evaluation highlights the variability in computation costs of differential privacy mechanisms. Approaches such as Elastic Sensitivity or Restricted Sensitivity incur little overhead, suggesting these mechanisms are ideal for performance critical applications such as real-time analytics. Given their higher performance cost, mechanisms such as WPINQ and Sample & Aggregate may be most appropriate for specialized applications where performance is less important than suitability of the mechanism for a particular problem domain. For example, WPINQ is the only evaluated mechanism that supports synthetic data generation, a task known to be highly computationintensive.
The performance of intrinsically private queries can depend on the database engine and transformations applied to the query. In this work we do not attempt to optimize the rewritten queries for performance. Unsupported queries. The current implementation of CHORUS applies a single mechanism to an entire input query. As a result, every aggregation function used by the input query must be supported by the selected mechanism, or the transformation fails. For example, consider a query with joins that outputs both a count and an average. Neither Elastic Sensitivity (which does not support average) nor Sample & Aggregate (which does not support join) can fully support this query.
This issue disproportionately affects WPINQ, since our implementation of WPINQ does not support COUNT(DISTINCT ...) queries. It is not obvious how to do so: the weights of any record in the database only reflect the number of duplicate rows until a join is performed (and weights are re-scaled).
It is possible to leverage multiple mechanisms in a single intrinsically private query by treating each output column separately. This approach would provide improved support for queries like the example above, which use several different aggregation functions. We leave such an extension to future work.
Related Work
Differential Privacy. Differential privacy was originally proposed by Dwork [16, 19, 17] . The reference by Dwork and Roth [22] provides an overview of the field.
Much recent work has focused on task-specific mechanisms for graph analysis [29, 49, 32, 33, 12] , range queries [28, 35, 36, 37, 56, 54, 13, 47, 8, 55] , and analysis of data streams [20, 50] . As described in Section 7.5, such mechanisms are complementary to our approach, and could be implemented on top of CHORUS to provide more efficient use of the privacy budget. Differential Privacy Systems. A number of systems for enforcing differential privacy have been developed. PINQ [39] supports a LINQ-based query language, and implements the Laplace mechanism with a measure of global sensitivity. Weighted PINQ [46] extends PINQ to weighted datasets, and implements a specialized mechanism for that setting.
Airavat [48] enforces differential privacy for MapReduce programs using the Laplace mechanism. Fuzz [25, 27] enforces differential privacy for functional programs, using the Laplace mechanism in an approach similar to PINQ. DJoin [41] enforces differential privacy for queries over distributed datasets. Due to the additional restrictions associated with this setting, DJoin requires the use of special cryptographic functions during query execution so is incompatible with existing databases. GUPT [40] implements the Sample & Aggregate framework for Python programs.
In contrast to our approach, each of these systems supports only a single mechanism and, with the exception of Airavat, each implements a custom database engine.
Security & Privacy via Query Rewriting. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work on using query transformations to implement differential privacy mechanisms. However, this approach has been used in previous work to implement access control. Stonebreaker and Wong [52] presented the first approach. Barker and Rosenthal [9] extended the approach to role-based access control by first constructing a view that encodes the access control policy, then rewriting input queries to add WHERE clauses that query the view. Byun and Li [11] use a similar approach to enforce purpose-based access control: purposes are attached to data in the database, then queries are modified to enforce purpose restrictions drawn from a policy.
Conclusion
This paper presents CHORUS, a system with a novel architecture for enforcing differential privacy for SQL queries on an unmodified database. CHORUS works by automatically transforming input queries into intrinsically private queries. We have described the deployment of CHORUS at Uber to provide differential privacy, where it processes more than 10,000 queries per day. We make CHORUS available as open source [3] .
We used CHORUS to perform the first empirical evaluation of various mechanisms on real-world queries and data. The results demonstrate that our approach supports 93.9% of statistical queries in our corpus, integrates with a production DBMS without any modifications, and scales to hundreds of millions of records. not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
